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Capitalism and Risk: Concepts, 
Consequences, and Ideologies  
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.† 
INTRODUCTION 
Politically charged claims about both “capitalism” and 
“risk” became increasingly insistent in the late twentieth 
century.  The end of the post-World War II boom in the 1970s 
and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union inspired 
fervent new commitments to capitalist ideas and institutions.  
At the same time structural changes in the American 
economy and expanded industrial development across the 
globe generated sharpening anxieties about the risks that 
those changes entailed.  One result was an outpouring of 
roseate claims about capitalism and its ability to control 
those risks, including the use of new techniques of “risk 
management” to tame financial uncertainties and guarantee 
stability and prosperity. Despite assurances, however, recent 
decades have shown many of those claims to be overblown, if 
not misleading or entirely ill-founded. Thus, the time seems 
ripe to review some of our most basic economic ideas and, in 
doing so, reflect on what we might learn from past centuries 
about the nature of both “capitalism” and “risk,” the 
relationship between the two, and their interactions and 
consequences in contemporary America. 
I. CAPITALISM 
Attempts to define capitalism have ignited “immense 
controversy,”1 and the only general agreement is that the 
  
† The author is the Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor at New York Law 
School. He would like to thank Robert Blecker, Jethro K. Lieberman, Richard 
Marsico, Carlin Meyer, Frank Munger, Rebecca Roiphe, and David Schoenbrod 
for their insightful comments, Michael McCarthy for his invaluable help in 
securing source materials, and Dana Cimera and Jordan Moss for their excellent 
research assistance. 
 1. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS 43 (1976).  
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term refers to a wide variety of arrangements that change 
over time. An “individual economy may be conducted along 
capitalistic lines to the most widely varying extent,” Max 
Weber explained.2 “The essential point to grasp is that in 
dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary 
process,” Joseph Schumpeter added.3 It is “by nature a form 
or method of economic change and not only never is but never 
can be stationary.”4 By the early twentieth century economic 
literature offered 111 different definitions.5  
True, what came to be called capitalism in the nineteenth 
century is commonly identified with certain characteristics: 
private property, contractual freedom, wage labor, profit-
seeking, invested surplus, competitive markets, expanding 
commodification, rationality and calculation, and production 
for sale rather than use.6 Those are all elastic concepts, 
however, and they define little meaningful consensus. Joan 
Robinson and John Maynard Keynes, for example, stressed 
the centrality of just one—the profit motive7—while Fernand 
Braudel denied that markets were specific to capitalism,8 and 
other historians have shown the same for wage labor.9  
  
 2. MAX WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY 275 (Frank H. Knight trans., 
Martino Publishing 2013) (1927).  
 3. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82         
(Harper Colophon 1975) (1942). 
 4. Id.   
 5. JURGEN OSTERHAMMEL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD: A GLOBAL 
HISTORY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 668-69 (Patrick Camiller trans., Princeton 
Univ. Press 2014) (2009).  
 6. See, e.g., Robert L. Heilbroner, Capitalism, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 688-93 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 
2d ed. 2008); Capitalism, in BARRON’S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 
TERMS 74 (John Downes & Jordon Elliot Goodman eds., 4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter 
Capitalism, in BARRON’S]. 
 7. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 50 (1927); JOAN 
ROBINSON, ECONOMIC HERESIES: SOME OLD-FASHIONED QUESTIONS IN ECONOMIC 
THEORY 25 (1971).  
 8. See FERNAND BRAUDEL, 3 CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM, 15TH–18TH 
CENTURY: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD 620 (Sian Reynolds trans., Harper & 
Row 1984) (1979).  
 9. See Jeffrey Sklansky, The Elusive Sovereign: New Intellectual and Social 
Histories of Capitalism, 9 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 233, 237 (2012). These views 
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Consider “competitive markets.” First of all, capitalist 
firms themselves regularly reshape the size and nature of 
competition by expanding or contracting their operations on 
both horizontal and vertical levels.10 More broadly, ideas and 
structures of competitive markets change.11 Recently, for 
example, defenders of capitalism have argued that economic 
concentration was necessary to preserve America’s ability to 
compete in global markets.12 Such an idea is light years from 
Adam Smith’s belief that “competitive markets” required 
large numbers of small and independent producers. Though 
still widely invoked in apologetics, Smith’s idea no longer 
seems applicable to most advanced capitalist economies 
marked by “large realms of monopoly, oligopoly, and 
monopolistic competition.”13 At a minimum, such changing 
ideas and structures show that even purportedly “essential” 
elements of capitalism exist in an evolving variety of forms.14 
Moreover, most supposedly essential elements of 
capitalism—contracts, markets, wage labor, private 
property, and economic surpluses—have existed for 
millennia and thus, however necessary to capitalism, cannot 
  
challenge Weber’s analysis which emphasized the critical role of “free labor” in 
rational “capitalistic calculation.”  E.g., WEBER, supra note 2, at 277. 
 10. E.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF 
INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 36-38 (1990); R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE 
LAW (1988). 
 11. E.g., MICHAEL H. BEST, THE NEW COMPETITION: INSTITUTIONS OF INDUSTRIAL 
RESTRUCTURING (1990); DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, 
AND GLOBALIZATION (2010); RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN 
AMERICA:  HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW (rev. ed. 1996). 
 12. See Corinne Crawford, The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the 
Current Financial Crisis, 9 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 127, 130 (2011). 
 13. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 2 (1970); see, e.g., Reed 
Abelson, Bigger May be Better for Health Insurers, but Doubts Remain for 
Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2015, at B3 (consolidation among health 
insurance companies defended on grounds of “efficienc[y]”). 
 14. E.g., W. W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST 
MANIFESTO 152 (3d ed. 1990); VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 
2001); Robert Boyer, The Variety and Unequal Performance of Really Existing 
Markets: Farewell to Doctor Pangloss?, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE 
EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 55, 66-70 (J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert 
Boyer eds., 1997) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM].  
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constitute any distinctive core. One could usefully see the 
distinctive core of capitalism as three interrelated ideas 
about private property and the dynamic tendencies those 
ideas generated: first, the idea that property can be abstract 
and liquid, appear in a multitude of forms, and be exchanged 
systemically through numbers written on paper; second, the 
idea that individuals should use property to create 
commodities for sale and profit rather than for their own 
consumption; and third, the idea that individuals should 
pursue their own self interest and strive to amass the largest 
amount of property as possible because doing so is both a 
social and moral good.  
Whatever its core elements and tendencies, however, 
capitalism manifestly appears in a variety of forms. 
Consider, for example, the slave economy of the antebellum 
American South.15 Although many have seen Southern 
slavery as “anti-capitalist,” it nonetheless operated with 
capitalist values, practices, and institutions. While it had 
distinguishing racial and cultural characteristics, it produced 
for profit and required for its success contracts, credit, 
insurance, private property, purchased labor, mass 
production, and expanding commercial markets.16 The cotton 
market—“the largest single sector of the global economy in 
the first half of the nineteenth century”—comprised “in 
actual fact a network of material connections that stretched 
from Mississippi and Louisiana to Manhattan and Lowell to 
Manchester and Liverpool.”17 The elaborate and manifold 
elements of that network constituted one particular form of 
capitalism, and consequently it was hardly surprising that 
the Bank of the United States, thanks to its mortgage 
business, became the largest slaveholder in Mississippi.18  
  
 15. See, e.g., Interchange: The History of Capitalism, 101 J. AM. HIST. 503, 510, 
516 (2014). 
 16. See generally IAN BAUCOM, SPECTERS OF THE ATLANTIC: FINANCE CAPITAL, 
SLAVERY, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (2005); SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE OF 
COTTON: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2014). 
 17. WALTER JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK DREAMS: SLAVERY AND EMPIRE IN THE 
COTTON KINGDOM 10 (2013); see also id. at 252-54.  
 18. RICHARD HOLCOMBE KILBOURNE, JR., SLAVE AGRICULTURE AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
MISSISSIPPI, 1831–1852 (2006). 
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The example of Southern slavery suggests two 
conclusions. One is that capitalism should not be identified 
narrowly with wage-labor but with the power of money to 
command labor, however purchased and controlled. The 
other is that capitalism has no “pure” existence and can be 
accurately understood only by examining its varied historical 
forms.  
The necessity of detailed historical analysis is 
particularly obvious when one considers the innumerable 
conflicting claims that have been advanced about 
capitalism’s alleged political consequences. Milton Friedman 
put one such contention bluntly. “The kind of economic 
organization that provides economic freedom, namely, 
competitive capitalism,” he declared, “also promotes political 
freedom.”19 Assuming that capitalist forms supported 
democracy in the United States, as Friedman believed, 
history shows that other capitalist forms in other countries 
failed to support democracy in the same way and to the same 
extent.20 Worse, it also shows that some capitalist forms 
readily opposed or abandoned democracy and were 
compatible with authoritarian regimes.21 German capitalism 
failed to stop Nazism, while major German corporations and 
business leaders worked closely with the Nazi government 
and reaped profits from its most blatantly anti-democratic 
policies.22 Indeed, the twentieth century introduced single-
party dictatorships directing forms of “state capitalism.”  
  
 19. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 9 (1962); see also FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN passim (1992) (drawing on 
Hegel to argue that capitalism and democracy went hand in hand and that their 
union represented the culmination of historical development). 
 20. See OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 5, at 572-633. 
 21. E.g., ROLAND SARTI, FASCISM AND THE INDUSTRIAL LEADERSHIP IN ITALY, 
1919–1940: A STUDY IN THE EXPANSION OF PRIVATE POWER UNDER FASCISM (1971); 
EUGEN WEBER, VARIETIES OF FASCISM (1964); THE ECONOMIC ACCOMPLICES TO THE 
ARGENTINE DICTATORSHIP: OUTSTANDING DEBTS (Horacio Verbitsky & Juan Pablo 
Bohoslavsky eds., 2015); David Baker, The Political Economy of Fascism: Myth or 
Reality, or Myth and Reality, 11 NEW POL. ECON. 227 (2006). 
 22. See, e.g., NEIL GREGOR, DAIMLER-BENZ IN THE THIRD REICH (1998); PETER 
HAYES, INDUSTRY & IDEOLOGY: IG FARBEN IN THE NAZI ERA (1987); HAROLD JAMES, 
THE DEUTSCHE BANK AND THE NAZI ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE JEWS (2001); 
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY IN NAZI GERMANY (Francis R. Nicosia & Jonathan Huener 
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Thus, sweeping generalizations about the relationship 
between capitalism and democracy—or between capitalism 
and any other form of government—are highly dubious.23 
Ultimately, they seem rooted in their proponents’ political 
perspectives and historical contexts, and they assume that 
capitalism has an essence that necessarily produces specific 
political consequences independent of time, place, culture, 
and historical context. History shows the fallacious nature of 
that assumption. If some capitalist forms supported forms of 
democracy under some historical conditions, other capitalist 
forms meshed with anti-democratic forms under other 
historical conditions.24  
II. RISK IN CAPITALISM 
The term “risk” can apply to any kind of peril, but the 
capitalist concept involves more than danger of future harm. 
It is an evaluative tool of business and finance with two 
critical characteristics. It is socially constructed, and it is the 
product of methodical calculation.25  
The social construction of risk seems obvious when one 
considers the diverse apprehensions of peoples who 
worshiped different gods, lived in different times and places, 
and relied on different material resources for their daily 
sustenance.26 One of the principal functions of culture is to 
  
eds., 2004). HENRY ASHBY TURNER, JR., GERMAN BIG BUSINESS & THE RISE OF 
HITLER (1985) explores the limits of businesses’ support for the Nazis. 
 23. Seriously establishing any such causal connection would involve, among 
other issues, answering difficult empirical questions about the extent to which a 
country was truly “capitalist” and truly “democratic.” E.g., DIRK PHILIPSEN, THE 
LITTLE BIG NUMBER: HOW GDP CAME TO RULE THE WORLD AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT 
IT (2015) (economic measures of economic progress are misleading and distorted); 
CHARLES TILLY, DEMOCRACY 59-66 (2007) (complexities involved in specifying 
extent to which a country is truly “democratic”).  
 24. See, e.g., VIVEK CHIBBER, POSTCOLONIAL THEORY AND THE SPECTER OF 
CAPITAL (2013). 
 25. See, e.g., Mark J. Machina & Michael Rothschild, Risk, in 7 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 190, 190-96 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence 
Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).  
 26. See F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 145 (1960) [hereinafter 
HAYEK, CONSTITUTION]. 
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define normative categories that shape perceptions of peril 
and therefore of risk.27 Further, recognition of risk depends 
on the geographical, practical, and moral distances between 
societies and whatever perils threaten, the methods of 
perceiving those perils, and the benefits and burdens of 
addressing them. Thus, social construction determines 
whether risks are recognized or ignored, considered 
preventable or inevitable, and ranked as minor or grave.28 
Capitalist forms privilege perils that accompany 
commercial and financial enterprises while minimizing those 
rooted in traditional and religious values.29 Insurance, 
spreading in the nineteenth century to cover previously 
ignored types of perils, illustrates the process. Death was an 
inevitability that rested in the hands of God until a 
combination of social forces—law, religion, industrialism, 
actuarial science, and corporate promotionalism—
transformed it into a “risk” that could be valued and used to 
encourage the exchange of small regular payments for large 
future returns.30 Similarly, economic changes in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generated new 
ideas about the interconnected nature of human activities 
and gave rise to concepts of “social risk” that brought novel 
proposals for “social” insurance.31 
  
 27. E.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (Karen 
E. Fields trans., Free Press 1995) (1912); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE 
COOKED (John & Doreen Weightman trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1964). 
 28. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE 
SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 29-30 (1982); 
Introduction to Part One: Theorizing Risk and Morality, in RISK AND MORALITY 
13, 15 (Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003); Steve Raynor, Cultural 
Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 83, 87 (Sheldon Krimsky 
& Dominic Golding eds., 1992). For changing concepts in the United States, see 
ARWEN P. MOHUN, RISK: NEGOTIATING SAFETY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2013). 
 29. See RISK AND MORALITY, supra note 28. 
 30. See generally VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1979). 
 31. See generally THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (1977); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE 
ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE 
REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004). 
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Capitalist forms not only shaped the cultural 
construction of risk, but they also transformed it into a 
methodical “calculating concept” for people learning how to 
“consume the future.”32 Identifying perils whose incidence 
and significance seemed calculable, capitalist forms gave 
them monetary “value” and created multiplying ranges of 
risk-based commodities defined in terms of the economic 
interests and legal rights of human beings. Odysseus faced 
many perils sailing the wine-dark sea, but in a capitalist 
sense his voyage posed no “risk” absent a credit obligation or 
insurance contract. 
The “rational calculating” characteristic of capitalism33 
was nowhere more apparent than in escalating efforts to 
identify, quantify, and value “risk.”34 In the seventeenth 
century, probabilistic reasoning was becoming common, and 
by the early eighteenth century governments were compiling 
massive sets of numbers by methodically collecting 
information on the characteristics and activities of their 
populations.35 By the nineteenth century statistical analysis 
was well established, with actuarial tables in common use 
and both the “law of large numbers” and the “bell-shaped 
curve” fully recognized.36 From there, ever more powerful and 
sophisticated statistical methods were developed and applied 
to ever broader ranges of human activity, making the “risk” 
involved in all of them a quality that could be calculated and 
given a rational market price.37 
  
 32. Introduction to Part One: Theorizing Risk and Morality, in RISK AND 
MORALITY, supra note 28, at 13. 
 33. Stephen Innes, Puritanism and Capitalism in Early Massachusetts, in 
CAPITALISM IN CONTEXT: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL 
CHANGE IN HONOR OF R.M. HARTWELL 90 (John A. James & Mark Thomas eds., 
1994); see also, e.g., WEBER, supra note 2, at 254. 
 34. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 233-36 (2000); BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL 
THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 52-68 (2010). 
 35. GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., THE EMPIRE OF CHANCE: HOW PROBABILITY 
CHANGED SCIENCE & EVERYDAY LIFE 6-26 (1989). 
 36. IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE 95-114 (1990); see also GIGERENZER 
ET AL., supra note 35, at 6-8, 53, 65. 
 37. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 234-35; MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 34, 
at 52; MICHAEL POWER, ORGANIZED UNCERTAINTY: DESIGNING A WORLD OF RISK 
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Thus, “capitalism” and “risk” functioned together, the 
former inspiring ways to create the latter by identifying 
perils that could be given economic value and legal 
protection, packaged in vendible forms, and traded freely for 
profit. Capitalism expanded by monetizing more “perils” and 
thereby creating more commodified “risks,” more value, and 
more wealth.38 As those commodified risks multiplied and 
their values swelled, capitalists layered and pyramided them 
to create ever more value while, in the process, creating ever 
more perils that could, in turn, be identified and transformed 
into ever more “risks,” ever more commodities, and ever more 
value and wealth.39 Thus capitalism and “risk” combined to 
create a dynamic for both astonishing economic growth and 
potentially devastating economic crises.40 
The belief that risk could be rationally calculated 
highlighted the concept’s social construction, for such 
calculations were products of human imagination and 
purpose. Thus, in understanding any particular risk it 
became essential to know who identified and calculated it, 
who used the calculation, and what results they sought.41 It 
became necessary, in other words, to understand the 
sociology of knowledge of risk.  
  
MANAGEMENT (2007); Introduction to Part One: Theorizing Risk and Morality, in 
RISK AND MORALITY, supra note 28, at 14.  
 38. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM 
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 55-56 (2000). Though 
insurance can shift “risks,” the human consequences of perils remain with their 
victims. See JONATHAN LEVY, FREAKS OF FORTUNE: THE EMERGING WORLD OF 
CAPITALISM AND RISK IN AMERICA 13 (2012); Barbara Young Welke, The Cowboy 
Suit Tragedy: Spreading Risk, Owning Hazard in the Modern American 
Consumer Economy, 101 J. AM. HIST. 97, 97-99 (2014). 
 39. See NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH 
COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 66-67 (2010). 
 40. E.g., CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY 
OF FINANCIAL CRISES (1978); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS 
TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY, at xxxiii, xxxix, 292 
(2009); Christina D. Romer, Remeasuring Business Cycles, 54 J. ECON. HIST. 573 
(1994); William H. Sewell, Jr., The Temporalities of Capitalism, 6 SOCIO-ECON. 
REV. 517, 519-21 (2008). 
 41. E.g., Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices,            
22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771 (1988). 
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In practice, the capitalist habit of methodical risk 
calculation did far more than create value and enhance 
opportunities for rational market exchanges, for it also 
inspired those with sufficient power to use such calculations 
to shift anticipated risks onto weaker parties. Thus, as much 
as capitalism was about “risk taking” by bold entrepreneurs, 
it was also about “risk shifting” by the economically powerful. 
Adhesion contracts required individuals to surrender 
important legal rights and shifted risks from relatively 
powerful producers to those who commonly lacked either 
meaningful alternatives or adequate understandings of what 
they were surrendering.42 “Releases” from workplace or 
consumer injuries, “independent contractor” agreements, 
anti-union policies, race- and gender-based wage 
discriminations, and the use of part-time employees and 
unpaid interns shifted operational costs onto the weak, 
uninformed, and vulnerable.43 On a more sophisticated level 
investment banks, brokerage firms, and credit agencies used 
risk analysis to design complicated financial instruments 
that generated huge fees and profits while shifting the risks 
of those instruments onto distant, ill-informed, and often 
misled investors.44 Indeed, during the past several decades 
wealthy and powerful interests in the United States 
  
 42. E.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the 
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 679-93 
(1996). As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote almost a century ago, “the 
fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude duress.”  Union 
Pac. R.R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918).   
 43. E.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Action was Outside the Courts: Consumer 
Injuries and the Uses of Contract in the United States, 1875–1945, in PRIVATE LAW 
AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE: COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES IN 
BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 505, 505-35 (Willibald 
Steinmetz ed., 2000); Steven Greenhouse, More Workers are Claiming ‘Wage 
Theft,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2014, at A1. For the broad and unfortunate social 
impact resulting from the decline of unions, see JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS 
NO LONGER DO (2014). 
 44. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 34, at 231; see also BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER 
ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS 
FALL OF ENRON (2003); Nathaniel Popper, Goldman to Pay $3.15 Billion to Settle 
Mortgage Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2014, at B3. 
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succeeded in shifting a great variety of social and economic 
risks onto weaker and more vulnerable social groups.45 
Historically, the exploitation of government was likely 
the most extensive form of capitalist risk-shifting. Private 
entrepreneurs and investors enthusiastically relied on 
government to bear the greatest and most far-reaching risks 
involved in creating the conditions necessary for economic 
growth and private profit making.46 Those risks involved 
huge and continuous investments in elaborate order creating 
and enforcing institutions and in massive infrastructure and 
development projects, efforts whose risks were often 
incalculable but whose results radically expanded 
opportunities for private profit making. From courts, postal 
services, and police and military protection to highways, 
canals, railroads, and facilities for air travel to the internet, 
cybernetics, digitalization, and nanotechnologies, 
government investment and leadership underwrote economic 
growth, spurred ever more efficient methods of 
transportation and communication, and generated stunning 
new technologies that entrepreneurs exploited to create new 
products and industries.47 Thus, in capitalist societies 
governments commonly shouldered the economic risks that 
posed the greatest uncertainties and required the most 
massive investments, while private entrepreneurs and 
investors subsequently exploited the results.48  
Capitalist enterprises also learned to use risk in a variety 
of other profit-enhancing ways. Some hyped or created 
alleged “risks” to sell dubious products promoted as “risk 
  
 45. JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES passim (2002) [hereinafter 
HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE]; JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: 
THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2008) 
[hereinafter HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT]. 
 46. See, e.g., CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES,        
A.D. 990–1992 (1992).  
 47. MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. 
PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (PublicAffairs 2015) (2013); PETER J. WESTWICK, THE 
NATIONAL LABS:  SCIENCE IN AN AMERICAN SYSTEM, 1947–1974 (2003). 
 48. See OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 5, at 670.  
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reducing,”49 while others denied lethal risks to ensure the 
continued marketability of truly perilous products.50 
Financial services companies used risk to justify higher 
premiums and interest rates for poor and minority 
consumers even in the absence of sound statistical 
justifications.51 Some companies weaponized the risks 
involved in asserting legal claims against them by adopting 
costly and burdensome litigation tactics that discouraged 
potential claimants from challenging their practices and 
products.52 Others avoided risks of liability for the wrongs 
they caused by adopting legal devices that rendered them 
judgment proof.53  
Such uses of “risk” mocked a supposed moral premise of 
capitalism, the claim that there was a merited correlation 
  
 49. See, e.g., ALISON BASS, SIDE EFFECTS: A PROSECUTOR, A WHISTLEBLOWER, 
AND A BESTSELLING ANTIDEPRESSANT ON TRIAL (2008); BEN GOLDACRE, BAD 
PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND HARM PATIENTS (2012); 
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between risk and reward.54 It was fitting and reasonable, 
Frederick Hayek wrote, that wealth should flow to “men who 
accept the risk and responsibility of organizing the use of 
resources.”55 In practice, however, capitalist forms inspired 
and sanctioned many tactics that allowed the powerful to 
break the link between “risk and responsibility” and to reap 
the rewards while forcing the risks on others.  
III. RISKS OF CAPITALISM 
The most obvious risk of capitalist forms lies in the 
continuous and disruptive changes they cause.56 “Creative 
[d]estruction,” Schumpeter famously declared, “is the 
essential fact about capitalism.”57 For more than two 
centuries commentators debated the nature and direction of 
those changes, and extreme positions became familiar. 
Positive versions argued that capitalism produced freedom, 
opportunity, and economic growth and that it ultimately led 
to prosperity, democracy, and international cooperation.58 
Negative versions maintained that capitalism created 
massive inequalities, political oppression, and international 
rivalries and that it ultimately led to fascism, imperialism, 
and war.59 For positive versions, the risk was that capitalism 
would be rejected, and the result would be political and 
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economic oppression; for negative versions, the risk of 
capitalism was that it would proceed unimpeded, and the 
result would be political and economic oppression.  None of 
those extreme versions captured the complexities of 
capitalism’s risks and consequences, and all were 
oversimplified, essentially ahistorical, and ultimately 
obscurantist. 
One of the most intriguing characteristics of the debate 
about those alleged mega risks of capitalism was the extent 
to which analyses—including some positive ones—adopted 
the underlying trope of capitalism’s “contradictions.” Marx 
and Engels famously started the ball rolling when they 
declared that the bourgeoisie inevitably produced “its own 
gravediggers,”60 and subsequent analysts of varied stripes—
from Thorstein Veblen and Max Weber to Daniel Bell and 
Irving Kristol—developed theories of such contradictions.61 
Despite its frequent invocation, however, the trope of 
contradiction was misleading. While it lured capitalism’s 
adversaries with the promise of ultimate triumph and 
counseled its defenders with the wisdom of strategic 
compromise, the trope embodied a rationalist fallacy that 
obscured rather than illuminated. Capitalist forms created 
countless conflicts, tensions, disruptions, oppositions, 
uncertainties, and instabilities, but those consequences were 
hardly “contradictions” in any dialectical sense. Nor were 
they inherent components of any inexorable process that 
unfolded according to its own intrinsic logic. The trope of 
contradiction ultimately assumed an overarching unity, 
some pure form of capitalism with an unchanging core, but 
capitalism constituted no such logical unity and existed in no 
such pure form. 
The fallacy in the trope of contradiction mirrored the 
fallacy in the trope of the “iron laws” of classical economics. 
Both posited inherent logics that purportedly ruled economic 
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behavior, and both failed in the same way. They transformed 
acute insights into totalizing theories and thereby elided 
complexity, contingency, and contextuality. While capitalist 
forms tend to create certain kinds of risks and results, it is 
the specific form of capitalism in its specific context—not 
“capitalism in general”—that determines the scope, extent, 
and impact of those risks and results. Werner Sombart was 
insightful when he noted that capitalist forms showed “a 
tendency to proclaim the supremacy of business interests 
over all other values,” but he stumbled when he moved from 
tendency to necessity.62 Then, he declared that capitalism’s 
“acquisitive drive” was “quantitatively and qualitatively 
absolute” and necessarily brought “unscrupulousness and 
ruthlessness” that made “all moral and temperamental 
inhibitions disappear.”63 Such uncompromising claims led 
only to escalating abstractionism and unending disputation.  
Although “capitalism in general” had no absolute form or 
necessary consequence, its various historical manifestations 
did tend to pose certain common risks. One was dramatic 
economic expansions and contractions that generated 
periodic crises,64 while another was the tendency to 
concentrate wealth and increase economic inequality.65 Less 
obvious was the tendency to define risk in narrow economic 
terms limited to easily quantifiable and monetarily defined 
risks while minimizing or ignoring other kinds of real-world 
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personal and social risks.66 Perhaps the ultimate risk of 
capitalist forms arose from an apparently common drive for 
continual expansion,67 a drive that placed increasingly severe 
demands on the earth’s resources and environment.68 
One additional risk deserves special note. All societies 
harbor myths and visions testifying to their special nature, 
and capitalist societies proved no exception. While analysts 
made serious intellectual efforts to understand and explain 
the successes of capitalist forms, the growing wealth and 
concentration of economic power that accompanied those 
forms ensured tenacious support for rosier explanations that 
minimized their unpleasant and undesirable consequences. 
The resulting risk was that partisans of some particular 
capitalist form would seize on the rosiest theories available 
and transform them into glorifying ideologies that, like 
classic Marxist-Leninism, would lead them to deny any flaw 
in their theories and—if they acquired political power—
attempt to impose their prescriptions on their societies.  
Serious analysis of those relatively common risks of 
capitalist forms, however, cannot rest on mere generalities. 
As capitalism does not exist in any pure form, meaningful 
analysis must focus on specific historical manifestations.  
IV. CAPITALISM AND RISK IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 
The United States has been a capitalist nation for at least 
two centuries, but American economic ideas and practices 
remained fluid and diverse.69 Since the 1970s, however, as 
both capitalist forms and the world itself changed, those 
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ideas and practices also changed.70 While the nation 
continued to experience risks common to capitalist forms, one 
of those risks grew particularly acute. The last quarter of the 
twentieth century spawned glorifying capitalist ideologies 
that inspired true believers, spread into politics and popular 
culture, and helped make contemporary American capitalism 
colder and harsher for most Americans.  
Those ideologies promoted an idealized form of 
capitalism that their advocates identified with the most 
fundamental American value of “freedom” itself, labeling it 
“free enterprise,” “free price system,” and—most commonly—
“the free market.”71 By the late twentieth century their 
campaign had largely succeeded in equating the nation’s 
contemporary form of capitalism with “the free market,”72 
thereby masking the fact that the former was flawed and the 
latter imaginary. Unlike thorough and exacting analyses of 
real-world market forces that sharpened insight and 
illuminated economic processes, the market ideologies 
blunted understanding and obscured consequences.73  
A. The Rise of Contemporary Market Ideologies 
The 1970s introduced daunting new problems that 
demanded attention. Raging inflation and persistent 
underemployment challenged orthodox Keynesian 
economics, while acute social and political changes 
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reoriented American politics.74 The turmoil undermined faith 
in government, revitalized neo-classical economics, and 
fragmented the New Deal coalition.75 Anti-tax movements 
spearheaded the way, and by the 1980s anti-tax passions 
dominated economic “conservatism” and the Republican 
Party.76 Indicative of the dramatic reorientation in 
conservative thinking, neither Hayek’s classic work, The 
Road to Serfdom (1944)77 nor Friedman’s early polemic, 
Capitalism and Freedom (1962)78 gave significant attention 
to taxation, while no Republican presidential candidate from 
Barry Goldwater to Gerald Ford adopted the anti-tax 
ideology.79 By the 1980s, however, anti-tax ideologies had 
spread widely among Americans and became gospel in the 
Republican Party, and they spurred ever more fervent 
condemnations of government and ever more extravagant 
praise for its supposed opposite, “the free market.” 
The market ideologies indicted government tax policy, 
regulatory practices, social welfare programs, and all 
“interferences” with “private” economic activity.80 Although 
Hayek had consistently praised free markets in his earlier 
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work, he had also accepted a role for state regulation.81 By 
1976, however, he was insisting more fervently on the sheer 
benevolence of the market’s “spontaneous ordering” and 
condemning the very idea of any contrary “social justice,” an 
idea he castigated as a “quasi-religious superstition” that was 
“at present probably the gravest threat to most other values 
of a free civilization.”82 
By the 1980s Hayek, Friedman, and other market 
ideologues had become gurus of a fundamentalist faith that 
urged adoption of “market-based” policies across the social 
and economic spectrum.83 That faith transformed American 
ideals of freedom, opportunity, and liberty into abstractions 
designed to serve as unquestioned prescriptions for “the free 
market,” and it forged a passionate union between anti-
government resentments and ostensibly “true” patriotism.84 
Above all, the faith embraced two counterpoised moral 
assumptions: the economically successful were hard-
working, productive, self-sufficient, and morally exemplary; 
the economically unsuccessful were lazy, incompetent, 
willfully dependent, and morally dubious or worse. The 
former were worthy; the latter were not.85   
In retrospect, Irving Kristol’s Two Cheers for Capitalism 
proved something of a turning point. Disturbed over an 
“inner spiritual chaos” that was “created by the dynamics of 
capitalism itself,” Kristol offered a sharp moral critique of 
Hayek, a thinker whom he admired as “the most intelligent 
defender of capitalism today.”86 In elaborating his market 
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theory, Kristol observed, Hayek rejected the principle that 
“justice” required the “proportionality of reward to moral 
merit.”87 Instead, Hayek claimed that “in a free society it is 
neither desirable nor practicable that material rewards 
should be made generally to correspond to what men 
recognize as merit.”88 In taking such a position, Kristol noted, 
Hayek was “opposing a free society to a just society.”89 That 
was profound error. Human beings, Kristol countered, 
“cannot accept the historical accidents of the marketplace—
seen merely as accidents—as the basis for an enduring and 
legitimate entitlement to power, privilege and property.”90 To 
protect both capitalism and democracy, he urged, their 
defenders had to satisfy the nation’s “hunger for authority” 
by providing a unified moral justification for both.91 “The 
results of the political process and the exercise of individual 
freedom—the distribution of power, privilege, and property—
must also be seen as in some profound sense expressive of the 
values that govern the lives of individuals.”92 Calling for 
moral justifications for “the distribution of power, privilege, 
and property,” Kristol’s clarion inspired a generation of 
paeans to the virtues—economic, political, and moral—of 
“the free market.”  
George Gilder was one of those who responded. The free 
market, he announced, embodied the “key to peace and 
prosperity.”93 Although it brought unequal economic results, 
government interventions were far worse. They “always, 
unfortunately, turn out bad: highly skewed, hugely unequal, 
presumptively unfair, and changing little, or getting worse.”94 
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Every attempt to redistribute wealth “strikes at the living 
heart of democratic capitalism.”95 The unsuccessful must 
learn to appreciate the successful, for “the golden rule of 
economics” taught that “the good fortune of others is also 
finally one’s own.”96 Indeed, amassing great wealth was an 
achievement that demanded praise. “The risk-bearing role of 
the rich cannot be performed so well by anyone else,” Gilder 
declared.97 Providing for the general welfare—“turning gold 
into goods and jobs and art”—was the “the function of the 
rich: fostering opportunities for the classes below them in the 
continuing drama of the creation of wealth and progress.”98 
The new market ideologies relied on all-encompassing 
abstractions to support glittering simplifications that 
reached far beyond any policies reasonably necessary to deal 
with the distinctive problems of the 1970s and early 1980s. 
They claimed that “the free market” was the most “efficient” 
form of economic organization but refused to acknowledge 
the complexities and subjectivities embedded in economic 
concepts of “efficiency.”99 Equally, they dismissed the fact 
that their claims of “efficiency” were based on contrary-to-
fact assumptions about perfect competition and perfect 
market-clearing equilibria.100 Highlighting the importance of 
incentives and “self-interest,” they ignored the complexities 
of human motivation and the fact that the very idea of “self-
interest” was itself malleable and culturally formed.101  
The market ideologues draped their claims in absolutist 
terms, as though the concepts they deployed contained 
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inherent meanings that mandated the specific policies they 
urged. They claimed possession of such honored terms as 
“freedom,” “liberty,” and “property,” while avoiding the fact 
that those concepts represented highly complex and 
invariably qualified ideas whose practical significance 
changed as social, economic, and political conditions 
evolved.102 Continually invoking “liberty,” for example, they 
ignored the fact that “liberty” was always and necessarily 
limited to certain specific liberties that were compatible with 
both broad communal interests and competing individual 
liberties.  
Their absolutist thinking swept the ideologues to 
extremes. Jude Wanniski claimed that the free market 
constituted a “global mechanism” that boasted a “timeless 
coherence.”103 Left alone, it generated freedom and prosperity 
for all. Disrupted, it broke down, and such break-downs 
stemmed from the “intellectual failure” of politicians who 
dared interfere with the “timeless coherence” of that “global 
mechanism.”104 Similarly, as chair of the Federal Reserve 
Board, Alan Greenspan insisted that government regulation 
of hedge funds was unnecessary because they “are strongly 
regulated by those who lend the money.”105 “We must not lose 
sight of the fact,” he proclaimed with absolute conviction, 
“that risks in the financial markets are regulated by private 
parties.”106 Even after the nation’s most spectacularly 
successful hedge fund met financial disaster and collapsed in 
ruin, Greenspan continued to affirm the benevolent 
regulatory discipline of “the free market.” It took the 
stunning financial catastrophe of 2008 to force him to 
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concede—even then with the greatest reluctance—that his 
market thinking contained a “flaw.”107 
The way the market ideologues used the “Laffer curve” 
revealed their mindset. The “curve” was a theoretical 
construct that did nothing but illustrate the unexceptional 
point that there was some assumed level of taxation that 
would produce maximum tax revenues.108 The “curve” did not 
and could not specify the location of that maximizing level. 
Indeed, it could as readily suggest tax increases as tax cuts, 
and studies found that a maximizing rate could be as high as 
71%, many times what the anti-tax market ideologues 
desired.109 Moreover, the “curve” did not and could not dispute 
the fact that the actual impact of tax cuts would depend for 
the most part on prevailing economic conditions and that 
they would not necessarily stimulate enough growth to 
increase—let alone maximize—revenues. Finally, the 
“curve” did not and could not specify the proper beneficiaries 
of any tax cuts or identify the wealthy as their proper 
paramount beneficiaries. The market ideologues, however, 
ignored those facts and, instead, hailed the “Laffer curve” as 
proof of the unquestionable beneficence of tax cuts, especially 
steep cuts for the wealthy.110  
David Stockman, President Ronald Reagan’s first budget 
director, captured the true-believer mentality he saw 
animating the administration’s market ideologues. The 
“Laffer curve,” he wrote, resonated instinctively with Reagan 
himself because he had long resented high taxes on the 
rich.111 Thus, when Reagan heard about the “curve,” he “knew 
instantly that it was true,” for it “set off a symphony in his 
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ears.”112 Reagan and many of his advisors, Stockman 
concluded, embraced a “fiscal mythology.”113 They took the 
Laffer curve “literally (and primitively)” and regarded it as 
“magical.”114 
Further, to support their anti-government animus and 
“free market” faith, the market ideologies denied the fact of 
“private” coercive power and the growing oligopolization of 
the American economy.115 They defined “the free market” as 
a system that guaranteed economic liberty by giving all 
individuals the right to bargain freely and equally with all 
others, and they identified coercive “power” solely with 
governmental compulsion and its allegedly ever-present 
threat to their imagined ideal of absolute “liberty.” Thus, the 
market ideologies conjured away the hard fact that “private” 
power existed and that those who commanded substantial 
economic resources often compelled the compliance of 
Americans with few or no resources.116 
Not surprisingly, then, the market ideologies also 
ignored the fact that capitalist forms invariably relied on 
massive government support. From Hamilton’s national 
bank to the latest communication marvels of the twenty-first 
century, American governments at all levels created the 
conditions, infrastructure, and many of the innovations that 
fueled the nation’s economic growth.117 The United States, in 
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(explaining why workers are “free” according to market theory), with BARBARA 
EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001) 
(detailing some of the innumerable factors that intimidate and oppress low-
income workers).  
 117. E.g., BECKERT, supra note 16; SHARON ANN MURPHY, INVESTING IN LIFE: 
INSURANCE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 100-02 (2010); RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: 
THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2011); 
2016] CAPITALISM AND RISK 47 
 
fact, benefitted from “one of the most interventionist 
governments when it comes to innovation.”118 The nation’s 
space program, for example, provided a wide range of new 
technologies that private companies subsequently exploited, 
which led Republican Senator Ted Cruz to identify “NASA’s 
primary mission” as “exploring space and developing the 
wealth of new technologies that stem from its exploration.”119 
Equally, market ideologies ignored two of the most 
compelling facts of economic history, that governments often 
channeled market behavior effectively and that, when 
channeling laws were weakened or repealed, economic crises 
and depressions often followed.120 
Thus, on the broadest level the market ideologies 
dismissed historical context and glossed over the contingent 
and complex factors that actually determined changing levels 
of economic activity and social welfare.121 That compulsion to 
deny history led George Stigler, one of the major figures in 
the neo-classical revival, to advance “a hypothesis on the 
nature of political life” that was manifestly false on its face.122 
Because the “announced goals of a policy are sometimes 
unrelated or perversely related to its actual effects,” Stigler 
maintained, “the truly intended effects should be deduced 
  
GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS (Richard R. 
Nelson ed., 1982); THE POSITIVE SUM STRATEGY: HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR 
ECONOMIC GROWTH (Ralph Landau & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 1986). 
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from the actual effects.”123 Such an approach erased real-
world history from what passed as economic analysis. 
As a matter of that real-world history, the market 
ideologies in effect dredged up the standard claims of 
centuries-old, right-wing rhetoric, the arguments of 
perversity, futility, and jeopardy that Albert O. Hirschman 
so deftly illuminated. Those well-rehearsed anti-government 
and anti-“reform” assertions relied heavily on myths, clichés, 
stereotypes, personal biases, and stark oversimplifications 
that seldom captured real-world consequences. “[T]hey stand 
effectively exposed as limiting cases,” Hirschman concluded, 
“badly in need, under most circumstances, of being qualified, 
mitigated, or otherwise amended.”124  
The ultimate foundation of the market ideologies was 
manifest. Pre-existing social and political commitments, not 
the demands of any compelling economic reasoning, underlay 
their absolutist claims and blessed the unyielding faith of 
their true believers.125  
B. Risks and Results 
Backed by anti-government passions, determined 
economic interests, and a new Republican coalition, market 
ideologies helped reorder American life, and by the early 
twenty-first century their damaging consequences had 
become readily apparent.126 The field of economics embraced 
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neo-classic approaches, grew more theoretical and model-
based, and dismissed social, political, and historical 
considerations. As a result, the profession’s orientation 
became increasingly compatible with the market ideologies 
and tended to support a “thoughtless alliance with new 
business elites determined to use public policy for private 
rather than communal ends.”127 Repeated tax cuts brought 
huge and continuing government deficits and forced the 
nation into a growing reliance on foreign countries and their 
investments,128 while repeated cuts to government budgets 
led to declines in public services and accelerating 
deterioration of the nation’s infrastructure.129 In the field of 
corporate governance, market ideologies gave birth to the 
theory that corporations should seek nothing but the 
maximization of “shareholder value.”130 Rather than leading 
to the steady corporate growth that it promised, the theory 
brought lavish and excessive compensation packages to high-
level insiders, the pursuit of short-term goals that often 
compromised long-term corporate health, and substantial 
harm to the interests of shareholders themselves.131  
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In the field of education, market ideologies spurred a 
movement to make schooling a for-profit business. Roseate 
market-based promises finessed the real problems that 
plagued the nation’s educational system—racial segregation, 
concentrated poverty, and inadequate and unequal public 
funding—while for-profit schools, once established, often 
produced dysfunction and disappointment.132 For the political 
right, however, the movement offered significant benefits: 
new opportunities for private profit, a tool for weakening 
teachers’ unions, and a rationale for reducing government 
funding for public education and justifying additional tax 
cuts. Advocates of market-based proposals “have an 
implacable hostility toward the public sector,” Diane Ravitch 
concluded, and their reforms have “opened the public coffers 
to profiteering, fraud, and exploitation by large and small 
entrepreneurs.”133  
Market ideologies proved particularly harmful to the 
cause of environmental protection. Although scientific 
evidence of the anthropogenic causes of climate change was 
overwhelming,134 many influenced by market ideologies 
ignored or denied it. They recognized that—if the scientific 
evidence were accepted—it would require governments to act 
vigorously to channel economic behavior along more 
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salutary, long-term lines.135 Because true believers could not 
abide such a possibility, they were compelled to reject the 
overwhelming findings of science and ignore increasingly 
acute environmental dangers that threatened the United 
States and the world.136  
The market ideologies caused other harms that were 
more immediately obvious. The devastating crash of 2008 
was a spectacular example.137 Market ideologies led both 
government agencies and private institutions to assume that 
“the free market” would operate automatically and 
efficiently. Actors throughout the system lost vigilance while 
many abandoned their sense of personal responsibility and 
gambled on geometrically multiplying financial risks.138 
“[D]ecades of free-market fundamentalism,” Nouriel Roubini, 
the co-author of an elaborate study on the crash, concluded, 
“laid the foundation for the meltdown.”139 The crash 
demonstrated that “free market” arrangements often failed 
in their alleged “disciplinary” function and that whatever 
discipline they did impose was erratic and unreliable.140 
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“Relying on institutional investors to self-regulate,” one 
economist conceded, “is the economic equivalent of letting 
children decide their own diets.”141  
Equally important, the meltdown demonstrated that 
government deregulation did not lead to “the free market” as 
true believers proclaimed. Rather, deregulation simply 
transferred more economic decision-making power to the 
economic elite that controlled the nation’s dominant private 
economic institutions,142 and it was those institutions that 
pursued the policies and made the decisions that caused the 
shattering worldwide crash.  
Notably, the crash highlighted the risks inherent in the 
failure of absolutist market ideologies to take account of 
changing social and institutional contexts.143 Few economists 
anticipated the meltdown, and a great many believed that 
such a meltdown was virtually impossible. Most thought that 
wise monetary policy would—as Friedman had taught—
prevent future economic catastrophes,144 while market 
ideologues adamantly insisted—as Greenspan had 
preached—that the self-checking operations of “the free 
market” would prevent such disasters. Accordingly, they 
failed to recognize the acute risks involved in radically 
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escalating levels of debt and in new financial practices that 
were shoddy and exceptionally risky, if not downright 
fraudulent. Equally, they failed to understand the 
significance of profound changes in the financial world from 
the rapid growth of unregulated “shadow banking” to the 
expanding role of international capital markets and the 
multiplying complexities of the global economy.145  
The crash also spotlighted another baleful consequence 
of the market ideologies: rapidly increasing wealth 
inequality.146 Compared to other developed countries, the 
United States struggled with “one of the highest levels of 
wealth inequality overall.”147 The policies of the market 
ideologues brought “wage inequality” that was “relatively 
high and fast-growing”148 and, by the early twenty-first 
century, the “highest level of disposable income inequality 
among high-income economies.”149  
That painfully sharpening inequality was hardly 
surprising, for the policies that the market ideologies 
demanded were designed to advantage the wealthy. Steep 
tax cuts on high incomes, repeal of the inheritance tax, lower 
capital-gains taxes, rock-bottom effective corporate tax rates, 
and allowance of corporate “inversions” that shifted tax 
liabilities to foreign tax havens all led to denser 
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concentrations of private wealth.150 Similarly, skyrocketing 
compensation packages for corporate executives and 
exceptionally low tax rates for hedge fund managers allowed 
a relative handful of well-placed individuals to garner 
incomes reaching billions of dollars a year. In 2014 the bonus 
pool for Wall Street personnel was double the total amount 
of money earned by all Americans who worked full time for 
the federal minimum wage.151  
Compounding those results, the market ideologies 
supported other policies that directly disadvantaged ordinary 
Americans. Corporate outsourcing of jobs, growing use of 
“part-time” employees, restrictions on labor unions, cuts in 
welfare programs, and threats to Social Security and 
government-supported health care struck at the welfare of 
millions.152 The deepening economic inequality that resulted 
spurred a cascade of further harms. It altered marriage 
practices and family arrangements, for example, which drove 
many out of the “middle class” and further widened the gulf 
between wealthy elites and the majority of Americans.153 
Finally, the tax cuts the market ideologies sponsored caused 
ever-deepening government deficits and thereby provided 
further justification for their continuing “frontal attack on 
the welfare state.”154  
Reinforcing those policies, market ideologies infiltrated 
the United States Supreme Court and helped reshape 
American law to impose additional burdens on ordinary 
Americans. Controlled by a five-justice Republican majority 
shaped by their party’s market ideologies, the Court 
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assiduously protected corporate interests by shifting the 
costs of economic enterprise onto vulnerable workers, 
consumers, tort victims, civil rights plaintiffs, and claimants 
who sought remedies under various federal statutes for the 
economic injuries they suffered. Through a variety of 
techniques, the Court restricted their access to the courts, 
multiplied the obstacles they faced, and narrowed the rights 
they could assert.155  
One of the most striking examples of the Court’s 
ideological drive came in a series of decisions dealing with 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The decisions limited 
the forums where corporations could be sued, thus reducing 
their potential liabilities and forcing on vulnerable parties 
the burdens of pursuing remedies in distant and often foreign 
forums.156 The Court did so, moreover, by discriminating 
against individual defendants in favor of corporate 
defendants.157 Perhaps more shocking, it did so in a way likely 
to encourage American companies to send ever more jobs and 
investments overseas.158 Most ominous, four of the 
Republican justices implicitly rejected the public-protecting 
constitutional principle established in International Shoe Co. 
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v. Washington almost three quarters of a century ago.159 
International Shoe held that sellers should not be allowed to 
systematically sell their products and make their profits in a 
forum while, at the same time, artfully manipulating legal 
technicalities to avoid the forum’s jurisdiction over claims 
related to their profit-making activities in that forum.160 In 
McIntyre Machinery the four rejected that proposition and 
approved precisely that kind of artful manipulation.161  
Perhaps most fundamental, the market ideologies put 
American democracy itself at grave risk. Portraying 
democracy and the market as conjoined twins, they 
essentially equated the two.162 “Markets are voting 
machines,” proclaimed Citibank’s chairman, Walter Wriston; 
“they function by taking referenda” and give “power to the 
people.”163 Although markets gave no meaningful power to 
the great majority of people, market ideologies did help make 
contemporary American democracy more congruent with 
“free market” economics. In both, massive flows of privately 
controlled capital substantially shaped the relevant markets; 
the products available to “purchaser/voters” were limited to 
those that dominant institutions placed on the market; 
and—perhaps most salient—“purchaser/voters” with the 
most money were able to command the most market power.164  
The market ideologies accelerated the commodification of 
American democracy and its transformation into a 
plebiscitarian plutocracy governed by “free market politics,” 
a system in which the “revealed preferences”—the 
willingness of buyers to spend their money for desired 
products—of exceptionally wealthy individuals and 
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resource-laden corporations increasingly shaped issues, 
campaigns, and sometimes outcomes. “Free market politics” 
gave those powerful donors immense power to decide which 
potential candidates could seriously contend for public office, 
determine the ideological content and promotional strength 
of election campaigns, and mold the practical policy 
consequences that followed from almost any electoral 
result.165 Through a wink-and-nod system euphemistically 
labeled “access,” it ensured that the “information transfers” 
of the wealthy and powerful would regularly fall on the 
welcoming ears of candidates and office-holders heavily 
dependent on the sizeable, continuing, and purposeful 
campaign funding that only the wealthy and powerful could 
steadily and reliably provide.166 
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court’s five 
“conservative” Justices constitutionalized “free market 
politics.” Their decisions in Citizens United v. FEC167 and 
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quotation of Richard Briffault of the Columbia Law School). In the same years 
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election, half of all the campaign funds raised. Nicholas Confessore, Sarah Cohen 
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McCutcheon v. FEC,168 formally based on the First 
Amendment and a near absolute equation of money with 
“speech,” overturned precedents and invalidated legislative 
limits on campaign funding. Most important, in Citizens 
United they announced that only the prevention of 
“corruption” could justify limits on campaign spending and 
then ruled that only explicit “quid pro quo” deals could 
constitute such “corruption.”169 To drive their meaning home, 
they declared that neither “[t]he appearance of influence or 
access” nor whatever could somehow be portrayed as 
“independent” campaign spending could constitute 
“corruption.”170 With that tinier-than-the-eye-of-a-needle 
definition, they made Citizens United a guidebook that could 
fairly be entitled “Political Corruption for Dummies.”171 They 
taught all but the most willfully obtuse how to safely attempt 
to buy and sell political influence, policies, offices, and 
votes.172 Their support for “free market” politics served the 
  
 168. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the 
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Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (2005) (exploring the Supreme Court’s recent  
hostility toward campaign finance regulation and anticipating possible future 
changes in this jurisprudence).  
 169. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345, 357, 359.  
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proportion of total sales, both because it is easier for few buyers than for 
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interests of the Republican Party173 and fit snugly with the 
teachings of the market ideologies about the beneficence of 
self interest, the properly commanding power of “revealed 
preferences,” and the compelling need to honor and protect 
the interests of those who proved their virtue by amassing 
private wealth.174  
CONCLUSION 
To reverse those damaging developments and preserve a 
shared and genuine freedom, equality, and democracy, it is 
essential to understand the socially constructed nature of 
markets, identify the visible hands that shape those markets, 
and recognize the practical consequences of the nation’s 
contemporary form of “free market” capitalism. It is 
essential, in other words, to recognize the economic fallacies 
and political biases embedded in the market ideologies. Such 
recognition can lead to new and effective policies designed to 
reshape real-world markets for everyone’s benefit.175 
Americans have consistently rejected the Marxist idea 
that capitalism means “class conflict,” and their rejection 
sounds a healthy national principle. So an authentic 




many to combine for collective action and simply because each one may 
have much at stake and wield considerable power even in isolation. 
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